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Abstract
The security pi-calculus is a typed version of the asynchronous pi-calculus in which the types, in addition
to constraining the input/output behaviour of processes, have security levels associated with them. This
enables us to introduce a range of typing disciplines which allow input or output behaviour, or both, to be
bounded above or below by a given security level.
We define typed versions of may and must equivalences for the security pi-calculus, where the tests are
parameterised relative to a security level. We provide alternative characterisations of these equivalences in
terms of actions in context ; these describe the actions a process may perform, assuming the observer is
constrained by a given typing environment.
Using these alternative characterisations we prove non-interference results with respect to may and must
testing. These show that information flow between security levels can be controlled using our typing systems.
Keywords: Distributed Systems, picalculus, security types, non-interference, testing equivalences.
1 Introduction
The asynchronous pi-calculus, [2,13], is a simple formalism for describing distributed
processes. It presupposes a set of channel names through which processes commu-
nicate. Thus a?(X)P is a process which inputs some value v on the channel a,
and executes the body P in which X has been substituted by the value v, while
output on the same channel is denoted by a!〈v〉. These two primitives, together
with operators for parallelism, |, repetition, ∗, and channel scoping, (new n) , make
the pi-calculus a very powerful language. For example the term P ,
∗ req?(x, y) (new r) s!〈x, r〉 | r?(z) y!〈z〉
describes a process which repeatedly receives a request on the channel req, consisting
of a value, bound to x, and a return channel, bound to y. This value is in turn
sent along the channel s, presumably serviced by some independent server, together
1 This research has been partially funded by the EU Global Computing projects Mikado and Myths
2 Email:matthewh@cogs.sussex.ac.uk
with a private return channel r, generated specifically for this purpose. A response
is awaited from the service, on the reply channel r, which is then forwarded on the
original return channel y.
Numerous typing systems have been developed for this language, [17,23,24].
Most are based on judgements of the form Γ ` P indicating that the process P is
well-typed with respect to the channel environment Γ, which associates capabilities
with the free channel names of P . Usually these capabilities are some elaboration
of
read capabilities r〈T〉: the ability to read values at type T from a channel
write capabilities w〈T〉: the ability to write values at type T to a channel
For example let A denote the tuple type (int,w〈int〉); a value of this type will
consist of a pair, the first element of which is an integer, and the second a channel
on which integers may be written. If Γ associates the type r〈A〉 with the channel
req and the type w〈A〉 with s, we would expect the above term, P , to be well-
typed with respect to Γ. However for this to be true the local channel r needs to
be generated with the write capability w〈int〉, to be sent along the channel s, and
the read capability r〈int〉, which is used by the process itself. Thus if we were to
annotate all bound names and variables with their required types we would obtain
the annotated term
∗ req?(x, y) : A (new r : R) s!〈x, r〉 | r?(z) y!(z)
where R is the type {w〈int〉, r〈int〉}, more usually written as rw〈int〉. This term is
well-typed with respect to the above mentioned environment Γ.
Intuitively the use of types constrains the behaviour of processes, ensuring no
misuse of channels. By defining sophisticated forms of types process behaviour can
be more or less constrained, while at the same time the advantages of well-typing can
be preserved. For example a form of polymorphism is investigated in [17], while in
[11] security levels are associated with capabilities, to obtain so-called security types.
Suppose we have two security levels, high, denoted by top, and low, denoted by bot.
Then we would have capabilities of the form rtop〈T〉, rbot〈T〉, wtop〈T〉, wbot〈T〉,
where T in turn is a security type. By varying the precise definition of a security
type we can either implement resource access control methodologies, or ensure forms
of non-interference, [1,7,6]. In this paper we will be concerned with the latter, using
a mild variation of the I-types of [11]; essentially types are sets of read/write capa-
bilities, where in addition each capability is annotated by a security level taken from
some complete lattice . We will refer to the asynchronous pi-calculus, augmented
with these types, as the security pi-calculus.
The statement of non-interference results requires some definition of process
behaviour ; intuitively a system is interference-free if its low level behaviour is in-
dependent of changes to high-level behaviour. The main topic of this paper is an
investigation of the notion of behaviour of process, relative to a security level, for
the security pi-calculus.
Process behaviour is relative to some typing environment Γ and therefore we
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wish to develop a relation of the form Γ .σ P ' Q meaning, intuitively, that in the
typing environment Γ, both P and Q exhibit the same σ-level behaviour. By this
we mean that a σ-level observer will be unable to discern a difference between P
and Q. For example low-level observers will be unable to see any high-level actions
performed by P, Q. But more importantly we assume that these observers are
constrained by the typing environment Γ and therefore actions disallowed by this
environment will also be invisible to observers.
In this paper we investigate may and must testing equivalences, [15,8], for the
security pi-calculus. In particular we give an alternative characterisation of these
behavioural equivalences which, as might be expected from [15,8], are based on the
(asynchronous) sequences of actions that a process can perform. But here these
sequences are relative to both a security level and a typing environment.
These actions, which we call actions in context, take the form
Γ . P µ−→σ Γ′ . P ′
indicating that the process P can perform the action µ to interact with some σ-level
observer constrained by the environment Γ; this action affects the process P but
may also change the the typing environment of the observing process, from Γ to Γ′.
The remainder of this extended abstract is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
formally define the types we use, together with the syntax of the security pi-calculus.
This is followed with a range of typing systems. In the most straightforward we have
the judgements Γ ` P where Γ is a type environment, associating types to channel
names and variables. This means that relative to Γ, P uses its channels correctly as
input/output devices, ignoring their security annotations. We also have judgements
of the form Γ σ` P which indicates that in addition P uses channels with security
level at most σ. Similarly we have a typing relation Γ `σ P meaning that P uses
channels with at least security level σ. Indeed we can go further, designing relations
such as Γ r`σ P or Γ `wσ P where the read capabilities or the write capabilities of
processes are independently constrained. For all of these typing relations Subject
Reduction is easily established.
Section 3 is the heart of the paper. First the behavioural preorders and equiv-
alences are defined, by adapting the standard framework, [15,8], to the security
pi-calculus. We obtain the relations
Γ .σ P 'may Q and Γ .σ P 'must Q
indicating that P and Q can not be distinguished, relative to may/must experiments
respectively, by any testing process T such that Γ σ` T ; that is any test running
at security level at most σ, relative to the type environment. This is followed by
an exposition of the actions in context, sequences of which are used the alternative
characterisation of 'may; we also state a much more complicated characterisation
of 'must.
One benefit of having behavioural equivalences relativised to security levels is
that non-interference results can be stated succinctly. Section 4 contains two such
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statements. The first gives conditions ensure that
Γ .σ P 'may Q implies Γ .σ P |H 'may Q |K.
It turns out to be sufficient to require that the read capabilities of P and Q be
bounded above by σ, that is Γ r`σ P,Q, and that the write capabilities of H and K
be bounded below by some δ 6 σ, that is Γ `wδ H, K.
This is quite a general non-interference result. For example in the case where Q
is P and K is the empty process 0 we obtain
Γ .σ P 'may P |H
indicating that, under the conditions of the theorem, the process H can not interfere
with the behaviour of P .
This result is not true for the must equivalence. As explained in Section 4,
this is because our types allow contention between processes running at different
security levels over read access to channels. However by restricting the type system,
to confine read capabilities to a single security level, we show that a similar result
holds for 'must.
In this extended abstract all proofs are omitted. They may be found in the full
version of the paper, [9].
2 The Language
We presuppose a complete lattice 〈SL,,u,unionsq, top, bot〉 of security annotations,
ranged over by σ, ρ, . . .. For each σ we assume a set of basic types at that level, of
the form Bσ. If the security annotation is omitted, as in int, then we assume it
has security level bot; as we shall see values of these types are available to all pro-
cesses. Also, as explained in the Introduction, a σ-level channel type, for channels
accessible to processes with security clearance at level σ, consists of a set of σ-level
capabilities, i.e. a subset of Capσ. These may either be a read capability, of the
form rρ〈T〉, for some appropriate ρ and T, or a write capability, of the form wσ〈T〉.
These capabilities are constrained by consistency requirements. For example since
values with the capability wσ〈T〉 are written to by σ-level processes we require that
T in turn be a σ-level type.
Types, i.e. sets of capabilities, are also constrained. For simplicity in a given
type we only allow at most one write capability, and for each level σ at most one
read capability at that level. More importantly we ensure that, relative to security
levels, only write-ups, [7,1], are allowed by requiring that if wρ〈T〉 and rρ′〈S〉 are
in a type then ρ  ρ′; the additional constraint that T be a sub-type of S is well-
known [17,12]. The formal definitions of types and capabilities, together with their
subtyping relation are given in Figure 1. These types correspond very closely to
the I-types of [11]; the rule (rt-rd) ensures that only write-ups are allowed, from
low-level processes to high-level processes. But we allow multiple read capabilities,
which will enable us to be more flexible with respect to allowing/disallowing reading
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Fig. 1 Types
(rt-base)
Bρ ∈ Typeσ
ρ  σ
(rt-wr)
A ∈ Typeσ
wσ〈A〉 ∈ Capσ
(rt-wrrd)
S ⊆fin Capσ
S ∈ Typeσ
S consistent
(rt-rd)
A ∈ Typeρ
rρ〈A〉 ∈ Capσ
σ  ρ
(rt-tup)
Ai ∈ Typeσ (∀i)
(A1, . . . ,Ak) ∈ Typeσ
(u-wr) wσ〈A〉 <: wσ〈B〉 if B <: A
(u-rd) rσ〈A〉 <: rσ〈B〉 if A <: B
(u-base) Bσ <: Bρ if σ  ρ
(u-res) {capi}i∈I <: {cap′j}j∈J if (∀j)(∃i) capi <: cap′j
(u-tup) (A1, . . . ,Ak) <: (B1, . . . ,Bk) if (∀i) Ai <: Bi
The set of capabilities Cap is consistent if
• wσ〈A〉, wρ〈B〉 ∈ Cap implies σ = ρ and A is B
• rσ〈A〉, rσ〈B〉 ∈ Cap implies A is B
• wσ〈A〉, rρ〈B〉 ∈ Cap implies A <: B.
from a channel at different security levels. However subtyping is more restrictive;
unlike [11] they can only be sub-typed at the same security level; rσ〈A〉 <: rρ〈B〉
only if σ = ρ. Nevertheless this is compensated for in the existence of multiple read
capabilities.
Example 2.1
• The set {wbot〈int〉, rbot〈int〉, rtop〈int〉} is a bot-level channel type, an element of
Typebot; that is channels of this type may be transmitted on bot-level channels.
In turn these channels may be written to by a bot-level process or read by either
a bot-level or a top-level process.
• The type {wbot〈int〉, rtop〈int〉} restricts reading from the channel to top-level
processes, although bot-level ones can write to it.
• The set {wtop〈int〉, rbot〈int〉, rtop〈int〉} is not a valid type as it contains a read
capability at a lower level than its write capability.
• The set {wtop〈int〉, rtop〈int〉} is a top-level type but not a bot-level one; that is,
it is in Typetop but not in Typebot.
Proposition 2.2 For every σ, Typeσ is a preorder with respect to <:, with both a
partial meet operation u and a partial join unionsq.
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Fig. 2 Syntax
P,Q ::= Terms
u!〈v〉 Output
u?(X : A)P Input
if u = v then P else Q Matching
(new a : A) P Name creation
P |Q Composition
∗P Replication
0 Termination
X,Y ::= Patterns
x Variable
(X1, . . . , Xk) Tuple
u, v, w ::= Values
bv Base Value
a Name
x Variable
(u1, . . . , uk) Tuple
Multiple read capabilities in a type, such as {wbot〈int〉, rbot〈int〉, rtop〈int〉}, al-
lows processes at different security levels to read from the same channel. We can
eliminate such contention by using a restricted set of types.
Definition 2.3 [Single-level Types] Let SlType be the least set of types obtained
by changing the condition on read capabilities in the definition Figure 1 to read:
rρ〈A〉, rσ〈B〉 ∈ Cap implies ρ = σ and A is B.
Note that these types still allow communication from low-level processes to high-
level processes. We leave the reader to check that these types, ordered by <: also
has both partial meet and join operations.
The syntax of the (asynchronous) pi-calculus, given in Figure 2, uses a predefined
set of names, ranged over by a, b, . . . and a set of variables, ranged over by x, y, z.
Identifiers are either variables or names. We also assume a set of basic values, ranged
over by bv, each of which belong to a given basic type. We assume the standard
notions of free names and variables, fn(P ) and fv(P ), respectively, and associated
notions of substitution and α-equivalence, ≡α, are defined as usual. Moreover the
typing annotations on the binding constructs are omitted whenever they do not
play a role, as will most occurrences of the empty process 0. We also assume
the standard reduction semantics for closed terms, usually refereed to as processes.
This is expressed in terms of a binary relation over processes, defined inductively
via judgements of the form
P τ−→ Q
See the full version [9] for details, or indeed any standard reference to the picalculus
such as [21].
A type environment is a finite mapping from identifiers to types. We adopt some
standard notation for describing them. For example, for any identifier u let Γ, u : A
denote the obvious extension of Γ; Γ, u : A is only defined if u is not in the domain
of Γ. The subtyping relation <: together with the partial operators u and unionsq may
also be extended to environments. For example Γ <: ∆ if for all u in the domain
of ∆, Γ(u) <: ∆(u). We will normally abbreviate the simple environment {u : A} to
u : A and moreover use v : A to denote its obvious generalisation to arbitrary values
v; this is only well-defined when v has the same structure as the type A.
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Fig. 3 Typing Rules
(t-id)
Γ(u) <: A
Γ ` u : A
(t-base)
bv ∈ Bσ
Γ ` bv : Bσ
(t-tup)
Γ ` vi :Ai (∀i)
Γ ` (v1, . . . , vk) :(A1, . . . ,Ak)
(t-in)
Γ, X : A ` P
Γ ` u : rσ〈A〉
Γ ` u?(X : A)P
(t-out)
Γ ` u :wσ〈A〉
Γ ` v : A
Γ ` u!〈v〉
(t-eq)
Γ ` u : A, v : B
Γ ` Q
Γ u {u : B, v : A} ` P
Γ ` if u = v then P else Q
(t-new)
Γ, a : A ` P
Γ ` (new a : A) P
(t-str)
Γ ` P, Q
Γ ` P |Q, ∗P, 0
The first typing system is given in Figure 3, where the judgements take the form
Γ ` P
Intuitively this means that the process P uses all channels as input/output devices
in accordance with their types, as given in Γ. It is the standard typing system
for the pi-calculus, [17], adapted to our types; note that the security levels on the
capabilities do not play any role.
We can also design a type inference system which not only ensures that channels
are used according to their types but also controls the security levels of the channels
used. One such system is given in Figure 4, where the judgements now take the
form
Γ σ` P
This indicates that not only is P well-typed as before but in addition it uses channels
with security level at most σ. (This corresponds to the typing system used in [11].)
The only difference is in the input/output rules, where the security level of the
channels used are checked. For example Γ σ` a!〈v〉 only if in Γ the channel a can
be assigned a security level δ  σ, in addition to having the appropriate output
capability in Γ.
We can also design a typing system
Γ `σ P
which which ensures that P uses channels with security level at least σ. The only
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Fig. 4 Security Typing Rules
(lt-in)
Γ, X : A σ` P
Γ ` u : rδ〈A〉
Γ σ` u?(X : A)P
δ  σ
(lt-out)
Γ ` v : A
Γ ` u :wδ〈A〉
Γ σ` u!〈v〉
δ  σ
(lt-eq)
Γ ` u : A, v : B
Γ σ` Q
Γ u {u : B, v : A} σ` P
Γ σ` if u = v then P else Q
(lt-new)
Γ, a : A σ` P
Γ σ` (new a : A) P
(lt-str)
Γ σ` P, Q
Γ σ` P |Q, ∗P, 0
change is to demand in the input/output rules that σ  δ:
(hl-in)
Γ, X : A `σ P
Γ ` u : rδ〈A〉
Γ `σ u?(X : A)P σ  δ
(hl-out)
Γ ` u :wσ〈A〉
Γ ` v : A
Γ `σ u!〈v〉 σ  δ
We can provide further mix and matches. For example the type system
Γ r`σ P
ensures that all channels from which values are read have a read capability of at
most σ; the security level of the output channels is unexamined. This system is
obtained by using the rules in the original Figure 3 but with the rule (t-in) replaced
with (lt-in); the output rule is left unchanged. In a similar manner we can define
relations Γ w`σ P, Γ `rσ P and Γ `wσ P .
Theorem 2.4 (Subject Reduction) Let  denote any of the relations `, σ`
, r`σ, `rσ, w`σ, `wσ, and suppose ∆  P . Then P τ−→ Q implies ∆  Q.
3 Behavioural Theories
A test or observer is a process with an occurrence of a new reserved resource name
ω, used to report success. We let T to range over tests, with the typing rule Γ σ` ω!〈〉
for all Γ. When placed in parallel with a process P , a test may interact with P ,
producing an output on ω if some desired behaviour of P has been observed. We
write
P may T
if T |P τ−→∗ R for some R such that R can report success, i.e. R ω!〈〉−−→. The stronger
relation
P must T
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holds when in every computation
T | P τ−→ R1 τ−→ . . . τ−→ Rn τ−→ . . .
there is some Rk, k ≥ 0, which can report success.
We can obtain a testing based behavioural preorder between processes by de-
manding that they react in a similar manner to a given class of tests. Here we
choose the class of tests which are well-typed and use channels from at most a given
security level σ; that is we require that processes react in the same manner to all
tests T such that Γ σ` T .
Definition 3.1 [Testing Preorders] We write Γ .σ P ∼@may Q if for every test T
such that Γ σ` T , P may T implies Q may T .
Similarly Γ.σP ∼@must Q means that for every such T , P must T implies Q must T .
We use 'may and 'must denote the related equivalence relations.
So for example setting σ to be bot, Γ .bot P 'may Q means that in the type
environment Γ, P and Q are indistinguishable by low-level observers, from a may
testing point of view.
The aim of this section is to outline alternative characterisations of these equiv-
alences. It is well-known, [15,8], that testing equivalences are closely related to
the ability of processes to perform sequences of actions. We have explained in the
Introduction that here we need to relativise these sequences to security levels and
a typing environments for the observers.
The rules for the Context LTS are given in Figure 5. The judgements take the
form
Γ . P µ−→σ Γ′ . P ′ (1)
This judgement should be understood as expressing the fact that:
The process P , when run concurrently with any observing process T such that
Γ σ` T , can perform the action µ. This will transform P into P
′ and may also
transform the type environment of the observing process to Γ′.
These actions can take three forms:
internal move: Γ.P τ−→σ Γ.P ′ This corresponds to an internal move by P , which
does not depend on its environment. These moves are completely determined by
the reduction semantics.
input move: Γ . P (c˜ : C˜)a?v−−−−−→σ Γ′ . P ′ Here the observing process sends a value v,
possibly constructed using the new values c˜ at type C˜, to P ; the type environment
of the observing process will be augmented with these new values. An appropriate
write capability on a is required of the observing process for the action to take
place; see the rule (c-in).
output move: Γ .P (c˜)a!v−−−→σ Γ′ .P ′ Here P sends a value v, constructed using new
values c˜, along the channel a to the observing process; typically the observers
type environment Γ will be augmented with knowledge of v. This is implemented
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Fig. 5 Context LTS
(c-out)
rδ〈A〉 ∈ Γ(a)
Γ . a!〈v〉 a!v−→σ Γ u v : A . 0
δ  σ
(c-in)
wδ〈A〉 ∈ Γ
Γ ` v : A
Γ . a?(X : B)P a?v−−→σ P{|v/X|}
δ  σ
(c-open)
Γ, b :> . P (c˜)a!v−−−→σ Γ′ . P ′
Γ . (new b : B) P (b)(c˜)a!v−−−−−→σ Γ′ . P ′
b 6= a, c˜
b ∈ fn(v)
(c-weak)
Γ, b : B . P (c˜ : C˜)a?v−−−−−→σ Γ′ . P ′
Γ . P (b : Bc˜ : C˜)a?v−−−−−−−−→σ Γ′ . P ′
b 6= a, c˜
(c-red)
P τ−→ P ′
Γ . P τ−→σ Γ . P ′
(c-ctxt)
Γ . P µ−→σ Γ′ . P ′
Γ . ∗P µ−→σ Γ′ . ∗P | P ′
Γ . P µ−→σ Γ′ . P ′
Γ . P |Q µ−→σ Γ′ . P ′ |Q
Γ . Q | P µ−→σ Γ′ . Q | P ′
bn(µ) 6∈ fn(Q)
Γ, a : A . P µ−→σ Γ′, a : A . P ′
Γ . (new a : A) P µ−→σ Γ′ . (new a : A) P ′
a 6∈ n(µ)
via the rules (c-out) and (c-open), which uses the top type > to denote the type
consisting of the empty set of capabilities; note that this dominates all channel
types in the subtyping relation.
In the judgements (1) above it should not be assumed that P can be typed in
Γ; indeed in the rules of Figure 5 it is not even assumed that the process terms
are even typeable. Intuitively we expect the process P to be well typed in some
environment ∆ and that Γ represents that part of ∆ which is known to the user.
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.2 The pair Γ . P is said to be a configuration if there exists an
environment ∆ such that
• ∆ <: Γ
• domain(∆) = domain(Γ)
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Fig. 6 (asynchronous) Traces in Context
(tr-τ)
Γ . P τ−→σ Γ′ . P ′
Γ′ . P ′ s=⇒σ Γ′′ . P ′′
Γ . P s=⇒σ Γ′′ . P ′′
(tr-)
Γ . P =⇒σ Γ . P
(tr-α)
Γ . P α−→σ Γ′ . P ′
Γ′ . P ′ s=⇒σ Γ′′ . P ′′
Γ . P α·s=⇒σ Γ′′ . P ′′
(tr-async−in)
wδ〈A〉 ∈ Γ
Γ ` v : A
Γ . P a?v==⇒σ Γ . P | a!〈v〉
δ  σ
(tr-async−weak)
Γ, b : B . P (c˜ : C˜)a?v=====⇒σ Γ′ . P ′
Γ . P (b : Bc˜ : C˜)a?v========⇒σ Γ′ . P ′
b 6= a, c˜
• ∆ ` P
One can check that configurations are preserved by the relations defined in
Figure 5; in the sequel we will refer to such judgements, applied to configurations,
as actions in context.
It is worthwhile noting that in actions in context, (1) above, the new observers
environment Γ′ is not in general determined by the initial configuration Γ.P , unlike
in [10]. This arises because of the rule (l-out) in Figure 5. In general Γ(a) may
contain two read capabilities, rδ1〈A1〉 and rδ2〈A2〉, in which case Γ′ may take either
of the forms Γu v : A1 or Γu v : A2. However by restricting ourselves to single-level
types this problem does not arise.
We say Γ is a single-level environment if it only uses single-level types. For such
environments we can define the partial predicate Γ afterσ s with the property that
in every action in context, (1) above, if Γ is single-level then Γ′ must be Γ afterσ s;
see the full version [9] for details.
It is well-known that may testing is related to the ability of processes to perform
sequences of actions, but in an asynchronous language we must consider some form
of asynchronous sequences. In the present context this means generalising actions
in context to (asynchronous) traces in context :
Definition 3.3 [Traces] Let Γ . P s=⇒σ Γ′ . P ′ be the least relation which satisfies
the rules given in Figure 6.
Theorem 3.4 (Alternative Characterisation of May Testing) Suppose Γ.P
and Γ .Q are configurations. Then Γ .σ P ∼@may Q if and only if Γ .P s=⇒σ implies
Γ . Q s=⇒σ.
The extra ingredients required to capture must testing, in addition to traces,
are well-known from [15,8]; they include a convergence predicate, indicating that
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a process has no internal infinite computations, and acceptance sets, indicating
the next possible actions in which a process can engage. Here these need to be
generalised from processes to configurations; they must also be relativised to security
levels.
Definition 3.5 [Convergence] We say the configuration C converges, written C ⇓,
if there is no infinite sequence of derivations
C τ−→ C1 τ−→ . . . τ−→ Ck τ−→
This relation is then parameterised to sequences in context and security levels by
ε: C ⇓σ ε if C ⇓
s = α · s′: C ⇓σ s if C ⇓ and whenever C α=⇒σ C′, C′ ⇓σ s′.
Note that for a configuration Γ . P whether or not it converges is actually inde-
pendent of the typing environment Γ. However convergence relative to a sequence
in context is in general dependent on these environments.
We now adapt the definition of Acceptance sets, [8], to the security pi-calculus.
First let
Oσ(C) = { a! | ∃v.C a!v−→σ }
and
Rσ(C) = { a? | ∃v.C a?v−−→σ } ∪ Oσ(C).
Definition 3.6 [Acceptance sets] For a configuration C, let Aσ(C, s), its σ-level
acceptance set after s, be defined by
{Rσ(C′) | C s=⇒σ C′ 6 τ−→ }
Similarly let its output acceptance set after s be given by
{Oσ(C′) | C s=⇒σ C′ 6 τ−→ }
Note only acceptance sets from stable configurations, configurations C′ such that
C′ 6 τ−→, are used.
The security pi-calculus is asynchronous and therefore, as explained in [3], ac-
ceptance sets are too discriminating, when used to characterise must testing; to see
this it is sufficient to consider the simple example
a?(x) 0 ∼@must 0 .
The same reference goes on to explain that the use of output acceptance sets must
also be relativised to sets of input actions, which we now explain.
Input Completions. We use Iσ(C) to denote the set of input actions which the
configuration C can perform at level σ, { a?v | C a?v−−→σ }. More generally we use I to
denote an arbitrary multi-set of input actions, c(I) to denote { a? | a?v ∈ I } and
c(I) its converse, { a! | a?v ∈ I }.
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Then ↘σI is defined to be the least relation which satisfies
• C 6 τ−→ and Iσ(C) ∩ I = ∅ implies C ↘σI C
• C i=⇒σ C′ and C′↘σI C′′ implies C ↘σIunionmulti{i} C′′.
Intuitively C′ ↘σI C” means that C can evolve to a stable configuration C′ by per-
forming a subset of the input actions in the multi-set I; moreover this subset is
maximal in the sense that C′ can not perform any of the remaining actions.
Definition 3.7 [Asynchronous acceptance sets] For a configuration C, let OσI (C, s),
its σ-level asynchronous acceptance set after s, relative to the multi-set of input
actions I, be defined by
{OσI (C′′) | C C
′
=⇒σ, C′↘σI C′′ }.
With one final notational convention we can mimic the alternative characterisa-
tion of must testing from [3]. We write Γ allowsσ a?v if Γ σ` a!〈v〉; this is generalised
to sets of actions in the normal manner.
Definition 3.8 Let C, D be configurations of the form Γ . P , Γ . Q respectively.
Then C σ D if for every s,
C ⇓ s implies a) D ⇓ s
b) ∀D ∈ Aσ(D, s),∀I such that c(I) ∩D = ∅ and
(Γ afterσ s) allowsσ I,
∃O ∈ OσI (C, s) such that O − c(I) ⊆ D.
Theorem 3.9 Let Γ be a single-level environment such that both Γ . P and Γ . Q
are configurations. Then Γ .σ P ∼@must Q if and only if Γ . P σ Γ . Q.
4 Non-Interference Results
In this section we reconsider the approach taken to non-interference in Section 4
of [11]. The essential idea is that if a process is well-typed at a given level σ then
its behaviour at that level is independent of processes “running at higher security
levels”; or more generally “running at security levels independent to σ”. A particular
formulation of such a result was given in Theorem 5.3 of [11]:
Theorem 4.1 If Γ σ` P,Q and Γ t`op H,K, where H, K are σ-free processes, then
Γ .σ P 'may Q implies Γ .σ P |H 'may Q |K.
Here, because of our more refined notions of well-typing, and the characterisation
result Theorem 3.4 we can give offer a significant improvement on this theorem, and
moreover the formulation is actually easier.
Let us say that the security level δ is independent of σ if δ 6 σ. We can ensure
that a process H is “running at a security level independent to σ” by demanding
that Γ `δ H, for some δ independent of σ. In fact we will only require the weaker
typing relation ∆ `wδ H. This ensures that all the output actions of H are at a level
independent of σ, as can be deduced from the following property:
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Lemma 4.2 Suppose Γ `wδ H. Then Γ . H µ−→ρ, where µ is an output action,
implies δ  ρ.
Definition 4.3 We say a process H is σ-high with respect to Γ if Γ `wδ H for some
δ independent of σ.
We can now state our first non-interference result. Note that it applies to pro-
cesses such that Γ r`σ P, Q rather than the more restrictive Γ σ` P, Q, as in Theo-
rem 4.1; only their input actions need to be at level at most σ.
Theorem 4.4 (Non-Interference 1) Suppose Γ r`σ P, Q. Then
Γ .σ P ∼@may Q implies Γ .σ P |H ∼@may Q |K
for all σ-high processes H, K.
Non-interference with respect to may testing equivalence gives a certain level of
assurance that there is no information flow from high-level processes to low-level
processes. But it has been argued in [5] that the stronger the equivalence used in
the formulation of interference-freeness, the more we can be assured that high-level
information can not be leaked. An example may be found in [4] where it is argued
that the ability of a low-level user to observe the potential absence of actions may
result in an undesirable flow of information. Our second non-interference result,
which relies on the characterisation theorem Theorem 3.9, addresses this problem
as it is expressed in terms of must testing equivalence; this is sensitive to potential
deadlocks, and therefore the potential absence of actions.
First note that Theorem 4.4 is no longer true when ∼@may is replaced by ∼@must,
as the following example shows.
Example 4.5 Let A, B denote the types {wbot〈〉, rbot〈〉, rtop〈〉} and {rtop〈〉} respec-
tively. Further, let Γ map a to A and n to the type {wbot〈A〉, rbot〈A〉, rtop〈B〉}. Now
consider the processes P and H defined by
P ⇐ n!〈a〉 | n?(x : A) x!〈〉 H ⇐ n?(x : B) 0
It is very easy to check that Γ r`bot P and Γ `wtop H. However
Γ; Γ .bot P | 0 6∼@must P |H
because of the bot level test a?() ω!〈〉.
The presence or absence of H determines whether or not there is read contention
on the channel n, which in turn influences the deadlock capabilities of P with respect
to the channel a.
Here the problem is the type of the channel n; it may be read at both level
bot and top. Note that such examples, where there is contention between reads at
different levels, can not be expressed in the join calculus, [4].
A not unreasonable restriction would be to require that the read capability of
channels be confined to a particular security level, using single-level types. This
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would not rule out inter-level communication, but simply control it more tightly.
This restriction can be enforced requiring the type-checking to use single-level types
and forbidding high-level processes to read from low-level channels.
Definition 4.6 We say a process H is strong σ-high with respect to Γ if Γ `δ H for
some δ independent of σ.
Theorem 4.7 (Non-Interference 2) Suppose Γ r`σ P, Q, where Γ is a single-
level environment. Then
Γ .σ P ∼@must Q implies Γ .σ P |H ∼@must Q |K
for all finite strong σ-high processes H, K.
Note that we must restrict our attention to finite H and K since must testing
is sensitive to divergence; if H is a divergent term then we could not expect Γ .σ
P | 0 'must P |H to hold when P is a convergent term. This problem is avoided by
restricting attention to finite terms, which can never diverge.
5 Related Work
A general overview of the use of static analysis techniques to enforce information-
flow policies may be found in [20]. Useful surveys of research into non-interference
in process languages are given in [5,19] 3 . Much of this work is behaviour based;
systems are deemed to be interference-free if their trace sets, sequences of actions
labelled high or low, satisfy certain properties. Here we use a more extensional
approach, saying that a system is interference-free if low-level observers are unable
to discern the presence or absence of high-level components. There must, of course
be some connection between our definition and at least one of the behavioural
definitions in the literature. However the comparison is not straightforward. The
definitions, in papers such as [18,5] are for very simple untyped versions of CCS or
CSP, while much of the power of our approach comes from the use of types for the
more sophisticated pi-calculus.
In [14] a type system is given which guarantees non-interference with respect to
an extension of the pi-calculus; moreover non-interference is expressed with respect
to a barbed congruence. However the language used is a considerable extension of
the pi-calculus, with operators for selection based input/output, based on disjunctive
patterns, and it is the behaviour of these operators which are mainly constrained by
the type system. The types used are also very sophisticated. Unlike ours, which are
simply annotated versions of the standard Pierce/Sangiorgi types, [16], they track
the use of channels, using annotated affine and linear types, and capture causal
relationships between actions by a partial composition on these types, using ideas
based on the graph types of [24].
Finally [4], which uses security labels attached to messages in the join calculus
to formulate non-interference, argues via an example for the use of a behavioural
3 For the use of types for other languages see [22].
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equivalence stronger than may testing. The formulation uses weak barbed congru-
ence but could have equally well used must testing equivalence; indeed it is difficult
to envisage a practical scenario in which there is something to be gained from as-
suming attackers have the extra power associated with the former rather than the
latter. We have also already pointed out (in Example 4.5) that the join calculus can
not be used to express situations in which there is read contention between different
security levels. Nevertheless the approach used to develop a type system for the
join calculus for detecting information flow seems to be quite general and may be
applicable to the asynchronous pi-calculus.
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